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I. INTRODUCTION
R ECENT decades have witnessed an important development
in the law of real property-the recognition and expansion of
an implied warranty of quality in the sale of new homes. Retreat-
ing from the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, most courts today
recognize the existence of such a warranty, usually called an im-
plied warranty of habitability or an implied warranty of good
workmanship, in the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor.'
The implied warranty of habitability generally requires that
the house be "fit for habitation," or meet a test of good workman-
ship, or both. 2 Courts have treated this implied warranty as
analogous to a warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods, 3
and it is most often applied in sales of new houses by "merchant-
like" builders to a first purchaser. 4 The warranty of habitability is
designed to ensure that a purchaser will get what he expected-a
1. Numerous articles have documented the decline of caveat emptor and the
development of the implied warranty of habitability. See, e.g., Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in Sales of Realty: Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541
(1961); Grand, Implied and Statutory Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate: The Demise
of Caveat Emptor, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 44 (1986); Haskell, The Case for an Implied
Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965); Note, Liability
of the Builder-Vendor Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability-Where Does it End?,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 593 (1979); Note, Indiana's Implied Warranty of Fitness for
Habitation: Limited Protection for Used Home Buyers, 57 IND. L.J. 479 (1982); Note,
Implied Warranties in New Home Sales-Is the Seller Defenseless?, 35 S.C.L. REv. 469
(1984); Note, Defective Housing: Remedies Available to the First and Subsequent Pur-
chasers, 25 S.D.L. REV. 333 (1980); Note, When the Walls Come Tumbling Down-
Theories of Recovery for Defective Housing, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 670 (1982); Note,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Dream Deferred, 48 UMKC L. REV. 237
(1980); Note, Real Property-The Implications of Implied Warranty Protection for Used
Housing, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 515 (1986).
Some states have imposed the warranty by statute. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47-116 to 47-120 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982); MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to 10-205 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 327A.01 to
327A.08 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
2. See Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, 142 Ariz. 439, 690 P.2d 158 (Ct. App.
1984); Petersen v. Husbschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154
(1979); Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla.
1978); Note, Indiana's Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation, supra note 1, at
480.
3. See, e.g., Petersen, 76 Il1. 2d at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
4. Id. Early cases limited the warranty to sales of new homes by a builder-
vendor to a first purchaser, but the warranty has been extended to situations
where the policies underlying adoption of the warranty will be served. Subse-
quent purchasers have been successful in recovering under this theory, as have
purchasers of used homes. See, e.g., Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., 264 Ind. 227,
342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); see also Note, Indiana's Implied Warranty of Fitness for
Habitation, supra note 1, at 489-90 (distinguishing cases holding that implied war-
ranty of habitability should not extend to subsequent purchasers and purchasers
of used homes); Note, Real Property-The Implications of Implied Warranty Protection
for Used Housing, supra note 1, at 525-26 (citing authority which removed privity
1124 [Vol. 34: p. 1123
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 6 [1989], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/3
IMPLIED WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
house that is reasonably suited for use as a residence, 5 even if the
seller made no express warranties as to quality in the sales con-
tract, and even if the seller expressly refused to grant such express
warranties. 6 The purchaser is not protected against defects which
he knows about or which are readily visible upon inspection, 7 but
otherwise the warranty ensures that the consumer has a remedy
against the builder-vendor if the house fails to meet the standards
of trade for homes in comparable locations and price range. 8
Once courts began to recognize an implied warranty in the
sale of new residential property, the question of whether a seller
could contractually exclude or modify that warranty was certain to
arise. 9 Disclaimers of warranties and limitation of remedy clauses
have traditionally been recognized as legitimate ways for sellers
and buyers of equal bargaining power to allocate the risks associ-
ated with the sale of property, and the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) specifically recognizes the legitimacy of disclaimers of im-
plied and express warranties in contracts for the sale of goods. 10
However, disclaimers of implied warranties in general, and of the
implied warranty of habitability in particular, raise significant
problems for the courts because at least two important policies
come into conflict: the principle of freedom of contract, which
permits the parties to allocate risks by agreement, and the courts'
increasingly active role in protecting the consumer from losses
resulting from defective products. The question of whether the
purchaser actually knew about, let alone bargained for, the dis-
claimer provision frequently arises in these Cases, especially
where the purchaser signed a standardized form contract contain-
ing a boilerplate disclaimer clause.' ' More importantly, there are
requirement between builder-vendor and beneficiary of implied warranty of
habitability).
5. See Petersen, 76 Ill. 2d at 37, 389 N.E.2d at 1156 (quoting Goggin v. Fox
Valley Constr. Corp., 48 111. App. 3d 103, 106, 365 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1977)).
6. See Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 1981).
7. See Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. 11, 22-24, 476 A.2d 427, 433-34 (1984).
8. See Dixon v. Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1982).
9. See, e.g., Abney, Disclaiming the Implied Real Estate Common-Law Warranties,
17 REAL EST. L.J. 141 (1988); Anderson, Disclaiming the Implied Warranties of Habit-
ability and Good Workmanship in the Sale of New Houses: The Supreme Court of Texas and
the Duty to Read the Contracts You Sign, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 517 (1984); Larson,
The "As Is" Disclaimer and the Sale of New Houses, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 238 (1984);
Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in the Sale of New Homes. Disclaiming Liabil-
ity in Illinois, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 649 (1987).
10. For a further discussion of disclaimer of warranty provisions under the
UCC, see infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
11. See generally A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26 (1982) (discussing ad-
vantages, disadvantages and judicial treatment of standardized form contracts);
1989] 1125
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important policy rationales underlying imposition of the implied
warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes, and those poli-
cies are not served if a seller can easily exclude such warranty pro-
tection in the sales contract.
This article begins with a general discussion of the implied
warranty of habitability and the policies underlying its develop-
ment. The next section addresses the impact of certain provi-
sions of the UCC on the courts' determination of the effectiveness
of disclaimers in the sale of real property. The third section ex-
amines the criteria for effective disclaimers of the implied war-
ranty of habitability as developed and applied in case law,
concluding that in those cases were the disclaimer is effective,
policy rationales for imposing implied warranty protection usually
are not present. The final section discusses the impact of UCC
provisions on warranty disclaimers in real property transactions
and makes the argument that UCC provisions should not control
because there are significant differences between contracts for
sale of real property and contracts for the sale of goods; there-
fore, courts should address the effectiveness of disclaimers as a
question of social policy and hold the builder-vendor liable for
any substantial latent defects in new residential structures regard-
less of general contractual disclaimer language. General dis-
claimers of the warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes
by a builder-vendor should be void as against public policy.
II. NATURE OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN
SALES OF REAL PROPERTY
A. Rationales for Imposition of the Implied Warranty
The ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, or "buyer beware,"
placed the burden to discover any defects in the quality of real
property on the purchaser. The doctrine developed in agrarian
societies where the land, rather than structures, was more valua-
ble.1 2 Since one could readily observe conditions of land and
structures were much simpler, it was reasonable to presume that
both landlord and tenant, or seller and purchaser, had equivalent
access to knowledge of the conditions of the property.13 Because
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
12. See Note, Real Property-The Implications of Implied Warranty Protection for
Used Housing, supra note 1, at 518.
13. Id.; Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Dream Deferred, supra note
1, at 239-40.
1126 [Vol. 34: p. 1123
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the law presumed that the parties had equal knowledge and bar-
gaining power, it was reasonable to place the risk of any defects
on a purchaser, although the builder-seller could be liable in the
case of fraud or misrepresentation.' 4
However, the nature of the housing market began to change
substantially in the middle of this century, and the doctrine of
caveat emptor, especially in the sale of new homes, became an
anachronism, patently out of harmony with modern home-buying
practices. 15 Following World War II, an overwhelming demand
for new housing led to the mass-production of houses by builder-
vendors who sold a house and lot as one product, and hurried
construction and shoddy materials often resulted in poor qual-
ity.' 6 Purchasers of homes with substantial latent defects often
found that they had no remedy against the builder-vendor, even
though the builder-vendor was in a superior position to know
about a defect and to bear the cost of correcting it.17 As a result,
courts began to reshape and redefine the law to afford relief to
purchasers who otherwise would have no remedy under the tradi-
tional doctrine of caveat emptor. One commentator capsulized this
growing disenchantment with the doctrine of caveat emptor in an
article urging the adoption of an implied warranty of habitability:
"Strangely, the law places the entire risk as to quality upon the
party to the transaction with less knowledge or opportunity for
knowledge of the condition of the premises.' 8
Imposition of an implied warranty of habitability in the sale
of new houses recognizes that in the typical case, the purchaser
and builder are not on equal footing, and to apply the rule of
caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer in favor of a builder who is
engaged daily in the business of building and selling homes is
patently unfair.' 9 Residential structures today are much more
complex than in the past, making structural defects more difficult
to discover, while few purchasers have the expertise, opportunity
or ability to inspect a house for anything but the most obvious
defects. 20 To require a buyer to obtain an express warranty to
14. See Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 412, 175 S.E.2d 792, 794
(1970).
15. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex. 1968).
16. See Bearman, supra note 1, at 542.
17. See Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Il. App. 3d 17, 19, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988
(1977); see also Haskell, supra note 1, at 653; Note, Real Property-The Implications
of Implied Warranty Protection for Used Housing, supra note 1, at 516-17.
18. Haskell, supra note 1, at 637.
19. See Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 67, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966).
20. See Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 414, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795
1989] 1127
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protect himself in this situation is often unrealistic. Most pur-
chasers simply do not have the sophistication necessary to protect
themselves by bargaining for express warranties in the sales con-
tract,2 1 and this is especially true when the purchaser is asked to
sign an intricate, standardized form contract provided by the ven-
dor.22 Even if the contract does contain certain express warran-
ties, these are often limited as to duration or particular
remedies.23
Imposition of an implied warranty of quality in the sale of
new homes also encourages good construction practices and dis-
courages sloppy "fly by night" work in the industry, a problem
especially evident in the mass production of development
homes.24 By requiring a builder-vendor to comply with the build-
ing code in the area where the structure is located and to build
the home in a good and workmanlike fashion, courts set minimum
standards of good workmanship which discourage the unscrupu-
lous operator and purveyor of shoddy work.25
In early cases establishing warranty protection for the pur-
chaser of a new home, courts also recognized that the difference
between the law of personal property and the law of real property
had become so great as to be indefensible. 26 In some ways, the
builder or seller of new construction is not unlike the manufac-
turer or merchandiser of goods. Under provisions of the UCC
and its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act, an implied warranty
of merchantability and, in some cases, a warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, exists in the sale of goods.27 Common sense
tells us that the purchaser of a home should be entitled to at least
as much protection as the purchaser of a walking stick or a kitchen
(1970); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 561 (Tex. 1968). This is especially
true of structural defects which may not be observable once the building is
completed.
21. Haskell, supra note 1, at 642.
22. The contract most often used in sales of newly constructed homes by
builder-vendors is a standard form real estate sales contract that often contains
no warranties applicable to the construction of the house. See, e.g., Dixon v.
Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. 1982).
23. See, e.g., Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 264
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972); Bridges v. Ferrell, 685 P.2d 409 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
24. See Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 1981).
25. See Theis v. Heuer, 241 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972).
26. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1094-95, 449 S.W.2d 922,
923 (1970); Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Il1. App. 3d 17, 19, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988
(1977).
27. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1987).
1128 [Vol. 34: p. 1123
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 6 [1989], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/3
IMPLIED WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
mop.28 For all these reasons, a majority of states today recognize
an implied warranty of habitability or good workmanship in the
sale of new homes by a professional builder-vendor. 29
B. History of Development of the Implied Warranty
The rule imposing liability under an implied warranty of fit-
ness for human habitation was first adopted in the United States
in 1957 in a case where a defective sewer line caused flooding in
the basement of a house.30 Although that case limited the war-
ranty to sales of houses still under construction, courts have ex-
tended the warranty to include finished homes because there is
no rational basis for the application of a different rule when the
home is completed. 3'
Nor have courts been reluctant to extend warranty protection
in cases where policy rationales underlying the warranty are met.
For example, many courts have extended warranty protection to
include subsequent purchasers if the subsequent purchaser can
show that the defect was latent and traceable to the original
builder.3 2 The logic which has diminished the role of privity of
contract in the development of products liability law has been
used in these cases where a builder-vendor's implied warranty is
extended beyond the first purchaser; public policy has compelled
a change in the common law because there is no longer the usual
privity of contract between the user and the maker of a manufac-
tured product. Therefore, public policy demands that the privity
requirement be relaxed. 33 The extension of a builder-vendor's
liability to subsequent purchasers has been defended for several
reasons. First, a home which is only two or three years old
should, like a new home, meet minimum tests of habitability and
good workmanship. Second, a builder-vendor could too easily
avoid liability if that builder only needed to occupy the,home a
short time to defeat privity and thereby avoid imposition of liabil-
28. See Wawak, 247 Ark. at 1095, 449 S.W.2d at 923.
29. New York is the most recent state to adopt such a warranty. Caceci v.
DiCanio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 57-58, 526 N.E.2d 266, 268, 530 N.Y.S.2d
771, 773 (1988).
30. See Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
31. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402
(1964).
32. See, e.g., Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 230, 342 N.E.2d 619,
621 (1976); Note, Indiana's Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation, supra note 1,
at 489.
33. See Barnes, 264 Ind. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
1989] 1129
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ity under the warranty. 34 While extension of a builder's liability
to a subsequent purchaser is often justified, it raises the question
whether an exclusion or disclaimer of the warranty in the first
contract of sale effectively disclaims warranty protection for the
subsequent purchaser.35
The historical development of an implied warranty in sales of
new residential property indicates that the warranty is firmly es-
tablished and that expansion will likely continue because there
are strong consumer interests at stake. Purchase of a home is
usually the most expensive purchase most people make. It there-
fore seems only fair to put the burden of repairing defects in con-
struction on the person who is responsible for the defects, is in a
position to repair them and is able to spread the costs of the
repair. 36
C. Nature of the Implied Warranty
The implied warranty of habitability or good workmanship,
like the warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods, is
designed to guarantee that the purchaser gets what he bargained
for-a house that is habitable and meets standards of good work-
manship. 37 The warranty requires that the property be "fit for
habitation, '" 38 and the standard to be applied in determining
whether or not there has been a breach is one of reasonableness
in light of surrounding circumstances. 39 The age of the home, its
maintenance and the use to which it has been put are all factors
entering into this factual determination. 40 Although sales provi-
sions of the UCC do not apply to sales of real property, 4' many
courts have likened the implied warranty of habitability to the im-
34. See Park v. Sohn, 89 Ill. 2d 453, 463, 433 N.E.2d 651, 656 (1982).
35. See Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, 142 Ariz. 439, 441, 690 P.2d 158, 160
(Ct. App. 1984). For a further discussion of Nastri, see infra notes 132-41 and
accompanying text.
36. Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Il1. App. 3d 17, 19, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988 (1977).
37. See Haskell, supra note 1, at 635.
38. Different states may use different terms such as "habitability," "fitness"
or "workmanlike manner." See Comment, Buyer Protection in the Sale of New Hous-
ing in Illinois: The Implied Warranty of Habitability, 56 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1123,
1124 n.9 (1980).
39. Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621
(1976).
40. Id.
41. U.C.C. § 2-102 provides, in part: "Unless the context otherwise re-
quires, this Article applies to transactions in goods; ....... U.C.C. § 2-102
(1987).
1130 [Vol. 34: p. 1123
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plied warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods. 4 2 Like the
implied warranty of merchantability, which does not require a
perfect product but only one of reasonable quality or fitness, an
implied warranty of habitability does not require that a home be
perfect. It does require, however, that a home be fit as a shelter,
safe and aesthetically satisfying.43 Most courts hold that the war-
ranty lasts for a "reasonable duration," the length of which de-
pends on the circumstances and nature of the defect. 44
Warranties of habitability and reasonable workmanship are
not created by any representation of the builder-vendor and exist
independent of any such representations. 45 In what is clearly
analogous to the warranty of merchantability under the UCC,
courts are most likely to recognize the warranty when the sale is a
commercial sale of a new home by a "merchant-like" builder-ven-
dor to a consumer-purchaser. 46
The warranty is limited to latent defects in the property and
42. See, e.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yooles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 377-78, 525
P.2d 88, 90, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 650 (1974).
U.C.C. § 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this sec-
tion the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units in-
volved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
() conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987).
43. Petersen v. Husbschman Constr. Co., 76 I11. 2d 31, 37, 389 N.E.2d
1154, 1156 (1979) (quoting Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 48 Ill. App. 3d
103, 106, 365 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1977)).
44. Note, Indiana's Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation, supra note 1, at
492; Note, Real Property-The Implications of Implied Warranty Protection for Used
Housing, supra note 1, at 523.
45. Ecksel v. Orleans Constr. Co., 360 Pa. Super. 119, 129, 519 A.2d 1021,
1026 (1987).
46. Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. 1981).
1989] 1131
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does not extend to defects of which a purchaser has actual notice
or which he should have discovered upon inspection.47 But it is
not very difficult for the purchaser to prove the defect was latent,
or not discoverable, since one of the rationales underlying the
warranty is the assumption that the purchaser is not knowledgea-
ble in construction practices and must rely on the integrity and
skill of the builder-vendor. Courts assume that the ordinary pur-
chaser is not an expert, and defects which would not be apparent
to the ordinary purchaser upon reasonable inspection are covered
by the implied warranty. 48 For example, the requirement of rea-
sonable inspection does not mean that the purchaser must crawl
into the crawl space beneath the house or climb on the roof to
evaluate the soundness of its structure. 49
III. DISCLAIMERS OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
One of the fundamental policies underlying American con-
tract law is the notion of freedom of contract and the right of the
parties to negotiate the terms of their deal without intervention
by the courts. 50 Under this theory, the parties should be able to
exclude implied warranty protection at the time of sale or con-
struction of the house through a contract disclaimer clause. How-
ever, given the important policies underlying the imposition and
expansion of implied warranty protection in the sale of new
homes, courts are reluctant to permit sellers to escape their obli-
gations under the warranty through a simple disclaimer clause in
the sales contract. As a result, the disclaimer defense is fraught
with difficulty. 51
Most of the contracts for sale of real property today are stan-
dardized form contracts, and "boilerplate" exclusion or dis-
claimer clauses may be included in the pre-printed standardized
forms. 52 The use of such standardized contract forms are com-
monplace today in many kinds of transactions, and there may be
economic benefits to society in the use of such forms. 53 But in the
47. Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. 11, 22, 476 A.2d 427, 433 (1984).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 23, 476 A.2d at 433.
50. Holmes & Thurmann, A New and Old Theory for Adjudicating Standardized
Contracts, 17 GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 323, 325 (1987). The authors describe the
American courts as being "egregiously mired in the Serbonian bog of 19th Cen-
tury classical contract theory with its notions of free-will, presumed assent, duty
to read, and bound-by-what-you-sign judicial nonintervention." Id.
51. See Abney, supra note 9, at 141.
52. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 4.26, at 293.
53. Id.
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usual case, the consumer does not read the form, or, if he does,
he thinks that he cannot vary its terms. 54 Just as a purchaser often
lacks the bargaining power or sophistication to negotiate for
express warranties in the sales.contract, so he lacks the bargaining
power and sophistication to freely negotiate a waiver of implied
warranty protection in the sales contract. 55 Moreover, the pur-
pose of an implied warranty of habitability is to protect a pur-
chaser's reasonable expectation that he will receive a well
constructed and habitable house, and it is difficult to believe that
he would knowingly and voluntarily waive that guarantee except
in unusual circumstances. 56 Few people like the idea that a seller
can specifically disclaim a warranty that the house is habitable or
conforms to the standards of good construction. 57
No court has yet declared contractual disclaimers of the im-
plied warranty of habitability void as against public policy,
although these clauses are clearly not favored by the courts. 58
There are good reasons not to permit disclaimers in sales of real
property as a matter of public policy. However, the fundamental
principle of freedom of contract and the fact that disclaimers of
implied warranties in the sale of goods are expressly permitted
under the UCC have influenced courts to permit, at least in
theory, contractual disclaimer of the implied warranty of
habitability. 59
A. Relevant Provisions of the UCC
Even though only applicable in sale of goods cases, certain
UCC provisions are frequently cited by courts in real property
cases as indicative of a state's general policy regarding contractual
disclaimers. 60 For example, many courts have relied on section 2-
316, "Exclusion or Modification of Warranties," for guidance in
54. See Slawson, supra note 11, at 530.
55. See Haskell, supra note 1, at 642.
56. In the sale of a used home, such a situation might occur where a pur-
chaser was on notice that the home did not meet the requirements of the local
building code, and the price of the house reflected this fact. See Raynor v.
United States, 604 F. Supp. 205 (D.N.J. 1984).
57. See Abney, supra note 9, at 141.
58. See, e.g., Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Il. 2d 31, 43, 389
N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (1979) (any disclaimer must be strictly construed against
builder); Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 Ill. App. 3d 800, 806, 443 N.E.2d 36, 41
(1982) (same).
59. For a further discussion of instances where implied warranty disclaim-
ers have been held to be effective, see infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504, 509 (Wyo. 1983).
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determining the criteria to impose on disclaimers of the implied
warranty of habitability. Section 2-317, "Cumulation and Conflict
of Warranties Express or Implied," and section 2-719, "Contrac-
tual Modification of Limitation of Remedy" may also come into
play. 61 A purchaser also may argue that the contractual dis-
claimer is unconscionable: Like UCC section 2-302, section 208
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts permits a court to refuse
to enforce a contract or contract term which it finds
unconscionable. 62
In interpreting and applying the language of these UCC sec-
tions in real property sales contracts, courts have used many of
the same techniques and have encountered many of the same
problems as in sale of goods cases. Courts with a sympathetic
view toward consumers have been able to limit the effectiveness
of disclaimers in sale of goods cases, despite the specific UCC lan-
guage, by applying principles of unconscionability and liberally
construing certain terms in the UCC which seem open to flexible
interpretation. 63 Thus it is not surprising that courts have found
similar ways to render disclaimers in real property sales contracts
ineffective.
1. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranties (UCC 2-316(2))
The rule that determines whether a disclaimer of implied
warranty protection is effective in sale of goods cases is set out in
section 2-316. Section 2-316(2) provides:
61. For a further discussion of these UCC provisions, see infra notes 64-95
and accompanying text.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) states:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract
is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remain-
der of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial set-
ting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987).
63. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-1, at 428
(1980).
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Subject to subsection (3) [enumerating instances
where no implied warranties exist], to exclude or modify
the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it
the language must mention merchantability and in case
of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion
must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to ex-
clude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states, for example, that "There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
It is first important to note that this section expressly permits
disclaimers of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
But despite what appears to be specific language permitting ex-
clusion or modification of warranties, the application of this pro-
vision by the courts has been among the most unpredictable in
the UCC.64 This is true because courts simply do not favor dis-
claimers, especially where the plaintiff is an injured consumer,
and thus have utilized discretion-inviting terms such as "reason-
able," "consistent" and "circumstances" in this and other sec-
tions to exercise almost boundless discretion. 65 In sale of goods
cases, a court may also rely on UCC section 2-302 which permits
the court to refuse to enforce the contract or any clause if it finds
it to have been unconscionable at the time it was made. 66
In contracts for the sale of real property, most courts begin
their discussion of disclaimers of the implied warranty of habita-
bility by addressing the question, sometimes quite literally, in
terms of the requirements of section 2-316(2). This section, as
quoted above, requires that to exclude the implied warranty of
merchantability, the language of the disclaimer must mention
"merchantability," and if in writing, must be conspicuous. One
court has held that in real estate sales contracts, a disclaimer of
implied warranty should use the language "implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness" rather than "warranty of habitabil-
ity" because these terms are more meaningful. 67
There are no hard and fast rules as to what other kind of
language is required for effective disclaimer of implied warranty
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 4-6, at 160-63.
67. See Country Squire Homeowners Ass'n v. Crest Hill Dev. Corp., 150 11.
App. 3d 30, 32, 501 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1986).
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under the UCC.68 General language is probably sufficient-in
sales of goods cases most clauses fail not because they are im-
properly worded, but because they are inconspicuous or uncon-
scionable. 69 On the other hand, if a court simply finds that the
language of the disclaimer is, on its face, insufficient to be an ef-
fective disclaimer, that ends the question without further
inquiry. 70
The requirement of "conspicuousness" means that the
clause must be set out from the rest of the contract provisions in
some obvious way, such as capitalization, different typeface, con-
trasting color, or by some other attention-drawing devices. 7' Lo-
cation is also an important factor. Disclaimers on the back of a
document or obscured in many pages of fine print have been held
invalid because of lack of conspicuousness. Some courts place
similar requirements on disclaimers in the sale of real property. 72
In sale of goods cases, the UCC defines "conspicuousness"
in terms of a reasonable person against whom it is to operate. 73
Therefore, inquiry into the buyer's relative bargaining strength
and commercial sophistication is probably appropriate. The
same is true in real property cases. In sale of goods cases a "mild
controversy" exists over whether actual knowledge of the dis-
claimer by an unsophisticated purchaser is required, or whether a
seller must actually bring the provision to the buyer's attention.74
In real property cases, some courts have suggested that the buyer
68. To exclude the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
general language which is in writing and conspicuous is sufficient. See U.C.C.
§ 2-316 comment 4 (1987).
69. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 12-5, at 439.
70. This is true in sale of real property cases as well. See, e.g., Conyers v.
Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977). In Conyers, the contract con-
tained the following language: "There are no warranties on either house except
those manufacturers warranties that are in effect." Id. at 18, 364 N.E.2d at 987.
The court stated, "[t]o our view, the alleged waiver here was overbroad, too
general and too unspecific to adequately put the plaintiffs on notice that they
were waiving their warranty of habitability." Id. at 21, 364 N.E.2d at 989.
71. See U.C.C. § 1-210(10) (1987);J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63,
§ 12-5, at 441.
72. See, e.g., Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 I11. App. 3d 310, 317, 415
N.E.2d 1224, 1229 (1980); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 588,
410 N.E.2d 902, 909 (1980); Ecksel v. Orleans Constr. Co., 360 Pa. Super. 119,
127-28, 519 A.2d 1021, 1025 (1986).
73. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) provides that a term is conspicuous when it is so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it. "A printed heading in capitals .. .is conspicuous. Language in the
body of a form is conspicuous if it is in large or other contrasting type or color
.... .U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1987).
74. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 12-5, at 443-44.
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is required to put the purchaser on notice of the disclaimer, hold-
ing that "[a] disclaimer does not negate an implied warranty un-
less it is brought to the attention of the buyer and agreed to by
him.'75
2. "As Is" Disclaimers (UCC 2-316(3)(a))
In addition to a specific contractual disclaimer of implied
warranties under section 2-316(2) in contracts for the sale of
goods, the UCC also provides that all implied warranties are ex-
cluded by expressions like "as is," or "with all faults," or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's atten-
tion to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is
no implied warranty. 76 This section is supposed to apply in situa-
tions where the circumstances surrounding the transaction suffi-
ciently notify the buyer that no implied warranties are made or
that a certain implied warranty is excluded. 77 This in turn raises
the question whether an ordinary consumer who lacks knowledge
of the effect of an "as is" disclaimer should be allowed to bring an
action for breach of implied warranty because he did not under-
stand the legal consequence of the language. At least one court
in a sale of goods case held that he should. 78 In real property
cases, the purchaser's knowledge and understanding of the mean-
ing of the "as is" phrase may be an important factor in the court's
determination whether the language is sufficient to disclaim the
75. Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 56, 421 N.E.2d 1073, 1076
(1981). Requiring actual knowledge by the buyer is of course a way to protect
the consumer-purchaser, but it can raise problems of factual proof. For this rea-
son, some commentators have argued in sale of goods cases that the UCC drafts-
men intended "rigid adherence" to the conspicuousness requirement in U.C.C.
§ 2-316, in part to avoid these kinds of arguments. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 63, § 12-5, at 444.
76. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1987).
77. U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 6 states:
The exceptions to the general rule set forth in paragraphs (a), (b)
and (c) of subsection (3) are common factual situations in which the
circumstances surrounding the transaction are in themselves sufficient
to call the buyer's attention to the fact that no implied warranties are
made or that a certain implied warranty is being excluded.
U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 6 (1987).
78. See Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1084-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1978). This approach is justified under
U.C.C. § 2-316(c)(a) because the phrase "unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise," gives a court discretion in determining whether such a disclaimer
should be enforced. The fact that comment 7 to this section refers to such terms
in the context of commercial usage as "understood to mean that the buyer takes
the entire risk," is further ammunition for a consumer/purchaser, who may ar-
gue that he did not know the meaning of the phrase in its ordinary commercial
usage. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 12-6, at 448.
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implied warranty of habitability. 79
In cases under the UCC, although not explicitly required by
section 2-316(3)(a),80 most courts hold that an "as is" disclaimer
must also be conspicuous. The same is true in real property
cases. 8' In addition, under the UCC, a seller cannot disclaim all
warranties because, at a minimum, a disclaimer cannot reduce the
seller's obligation with respect to the description of goods. The
goods must be, in essence, what the seller has agreed to sell.8 2
There are no real property cases holding a disclaimer ineffective
on this basis.83
3. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties. Does an Express Warranty
Exclude an Implied Warranty?
In a case where a builder-vendor provides an express war-
ranty in the sale of a house, he may argue that the express war-
ranty supercedes or negates any implied warranty of habitability.
In these cases, a court may look to section 2-317 of the UCC for
guidance. Section 2-317(c) provides that "express warranties dis-
place inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied war-
ranty of fitness of a particular purpose."8 4 However, a court has a
79. The question whether a purchaser should not only know about but also
understand the effect of an "as is" disclaimer in order for it to be effective was
raised in Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 Ill. App. 3d 800, 443 N.E.2d 36 (1982). In
that case, the buyer, Schoeneweis, sought damages from the builder-vendor for
the costs of remedying defects in concrete work and shortage in the size of the
house. The contract contained an "as is" clause, but Schoeneweis said he did
not think he was waiving construction defects when he signed the contract. Be-
cause he could offer a plausible alternative explanation to the sense in which "as
is" was intended, the court held the agreement was not an effective disclaimer of
the implied warranty. This was so, even though the seller had argued that the
phrase "as is" is commonly used and easily understood. Suggesting that the
phrase was ambiguous, the court held that the seller could not show that waiver
of the warranty protection was in fact the agreement reached. Id. at 805-07, 443
N.E.2d at 41-42.
80. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 12-6, at 450.
81. See, e.g., Swaw v. Ortell, 137 Ill. App. 3d 60, 71, 484 N.E.2d 780, 788
(1984); Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 Ii. App. 3d 800, 807, 443 N.E.2d 36, 41
(1982); MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
82. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 12-6, at 449-50. A court that
wants to find a disclaimer ineffective despite the language of § 2-316(3)(a) can
also rely on comment 4 to § 2-313 which essentially states that a court cannot
give literal effect to a clause that purports to disclaim all warranties. Id.
83. Presumably, a court in a situation where a purchaser had not seen the
house before purchase (as when it is to be constructed to specification), could
take the same approach and require a builder-vendor to provide a house which
is substantially the same as that described.
84. U.C.C. § 2-317 states:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as con-
sistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is
1138 [Vol. 34: p. 1123
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great deal of discretion in determining whether an express war-
ranty is "inconsistent" with an implied warranty under this
section.8 5
In sale of goods cases, most courts treat an express warranty
separately from any attempted disclaimer of implied warranty of
merchantability. The implied warranty is construed as cumula-
tive, rather than "inconsistent" with any express warranty.8 6
Under this theory, most courts permit recovery under an implied
warranty after expiration of an express warranty, even though al-
lowing recovery after the express warranty has expired might
seem inconsistent to the average buyer.8 7 In real property cases,
courts follow a similar approach and consistently reject the argu-
ment that an express warranty precludes or limits the scope of an
implied warranty of habitability. Any waiver of implied warranty
protection requires language which is clear and unambiguous,
conspicuous and made with the purchaser's knowledge.88
4. Limitation of Remedies (UCC 2-719)
A different question is raised when a seller argues that a con-
tract clause limits a remedy, rather than excludes warranty protec-
tion altogether. UCC section 2-719 authorizes limitation of
remedies in sale of goods cases, and section 2-719(3) specifically
permits limitation or exclusion of consequential damages unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.89 A buyer of goods
unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which war-
ranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following rules
apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or
model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general lan-
guage of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other
than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-317 (1987).
85. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 12-7, at 461.
86. Id. at 458.
87. Id. at 462.
88. See, e.g,, Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Il1. App. 3d 310, 316-17,
415 N.E.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1980); Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Colo.
1981).
89. U.C.C. § 2-719 provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section
and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of
damages, I
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article,
1989] 1139
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can find ways around this provision in the UCC. For example, he
might argue that a stipulated remedy was not "exclusive" but
rather "in addition" to other remedies, that an exclusive remedy
"fails of its essential purpose" under section 2-719(2), or that lim-
itation of consequential damages is unconscionable.90
In the sale of real property, at least one court has held that a
limitation of liability clause should be treated no differently than a
clause which purports to exclude or disclaim an implied warranty
of habitability, and the same requirements should apply. In Col-
sant v. Goldschmidt,9 Colsant bought a townhouse from Gold-
schmidt. The contract contained an express warranty which was
subject to the following qualification: "Builder does not assume
responsibility for any secondary or consequential damages caused
by any defects." 92 When rain leaked into the basement of the
Colsant home, the builder promptly repaired a blocked drain tile
and no further leakage occurred. It cost Colsant $684.33 to have
the basement carpet dried out and the pad replaced, and he sued
the builder for that expense. 93
Goldschmidt, the builder, argued that under the UCC, sec-
tion 2-719 is less strict in allowing a limitation of remedies than in
allowing a disclaimer of warranties. 94 However, the Illinois Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court awarding Col-
sant damages for the ruined carpet, stating that the same require-
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-
conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole
remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail
of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not.
U.C.C. § 2-719 (1987).
90. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 63, § 12-10, at 465-71.
91. 97 I1. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073 (1981).
92. Id. at 54, 421 N.E.2d at 1075.
93. Id. at 55, 421 N.E.2d at 1075.
94. Id. The builder argued that the official comment to U.C.C. § 2-719
states: "Under this section parties are left free to shape their remedies to their
particular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying reme-
dies are to be given effect." Id. at 57, 421 N.E.2d at 1076 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-
719 comment 1).
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ments applied as in disclaimer or exclusion of warranty cases, and
the clause failed to meet the requirements of conspicuousness
and specificity. 95
B. General Requirements for Effective Disclaimers of Implied Warranty
in the Sale of Real Property
While a court may look to particular UCC sections for gui-
dance in real property cases, the requirements for determining
the effectiveness of implied warranty disclaimers in real property
transactions have developed in case law. In real property cases,
courts generally apply the same criteria to disclaimers of the im-
plied warranty of habitability in several different circumstances-
when the disclaimer is "express," when it is implied through the
use of an "as is" or "in its present condition" clause, when a
seller gives an express warranty which purports to exclude or
limit the implied warranty, and when the purported disclaimer is
actually a limitation of remedies clause.
A review of the case law indicates there may be as many as
eight different requirements for effective disclaimers of implied
warranty protection in the sale of real property. Not all of these
requirements must be met in every case, and many appear in
combination with others. What is clear is that in many instances,
conspicuousness alone will not save the disclaimer, although an
inconspicuous disclaimer is almost certain to be ineffective in ex-
cluding an implied warranty of habitability. 96
The express requirement of conspicuousness under UCC
section 2-316 is not applicable to disclaimers of implied warranty
in real property sales contracts, but courts do require that at a
minimum any disclaimer be written so that it is reasonable to con-
clude that the buyer has read the language. 97 As in sale of goods
cases, this means that the size of the print, location of the clause
95. The court called the limitation of remedies clause a "disclaimer." Id. at
55, 421 N.E.2d at 1075. When it applied the requirements for effective dis-
claimer, the clause failed to meet the test: the clause was not conspicuous. It
was located in the last line of the second paragraph amidst other clauses of the
same small-sized type. The clause did not mention habitability and did not ex-
plain the consequences of the disclaimer. Id. at 57, 421 N.E.2d at 1077.
96. See, e.g., Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Il1. App. 3d 581, 589, 410 N.E.2d
902, 909 (1980). Contra Arnold v. New City Condominiums Corp., 78 A.D.2d
882, 882, 433 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (1980) (holding that disclaimer was legibly dis-
played and could not be deemed invalid on grounds of "inconspicuousness"),
appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d 823, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1981). There
is a minority view rejecting the need for conspicuousness. See Abney, supra note
9, at 144.
97. See, e.g., Tassan, 88 Il. App. 3d at 589, 410 N.E.2d at 909.
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in the contract, and whether it is in bold or contrasting color is
relevant to that determination. 98 A disclaimer clause located with
other clauses on the back of a standard form contract, in the same
small print as all other clauses of the contract, will be ineffective
to disclaim an implied warranty of habitability.99
In addition to the usual requirement of conspicuousness,
courts require that the disclaimer be specific. Specificity means
that the disclaimer must not be "over-broad" or too general, 00
or that it specifically must mention the word "habitability" or re-
fer to a particular defect in the property.' 0 1 A disclaimer which
states "there are no warranties on either house except those man-
ufacturer's warranties that are in effect" is too general and un-
specific to meet this requirement.' 0 2 The disclaimer language
should also be clear and unambiguous, 0 3  and easily
understood. 0 4
Some courts require evidence that the parties actually negoti-
ated the disclaimer, or that the agreement was made with the pur-
chaser's actual knowledge of the disclaimer, 0 5 especially when
the disclaimer is a boilerplate clause in a standardized form con-
tract.' 0 6 The disclaimer clause will be strictly construed against
the seller, who is presumed to have drafted the contract or at least
to have provided it to the less sophisticated purchaser. 0 7
98. See MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
99. See, e.g., Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 46, 740 P.2d 1022, 1031
(1987); Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 57, 421 N.E.2d 1073, 1077
(1981); Tassan, 88 I11. App. 3d at 589, 410 N.E.2d at 909; MacDonald, 555 S.W.2d
at 919.
100. See, e.g., Conyers v. Molloy, 50 111. App. 3d 17, 21, 364 N.E.2d 986, 989
(1977).
101. See, e.g., Ecksel v. Orleans Constr. Co., 360 Pa. Super. 119, 128, 519
A.2d 1021, 1025 (1987).
102. Conyers, 50 Il. App. 3d at 21, 364 N.E.2d at 989.
103. See Belt v. Spencer, 41 Colo. App. 227, 230, 585 P.2d 922, 925 (1988);
Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 45, 740 P.2d 1022, 1030 (1987); Conyers,
50 Il1. App. 3d at 21, 364 N.E.2d at 989; Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290
N.C. 185, 202, 225 S.E.2d 557, 568 (1976).
104. See Larson, supra note 9, at 245 (citing Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 I1.
App. 3d 800, 806, 443 N.E.2d 36, 41 (1982)).
105. See, e.g., Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 Il1. App. 3d 53, 56, 421 N.E.2d
1073, 1076 (1981); Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 11. App. 3d 310, 316,
415 N.E.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1980); Conyers, 50 II. App. 3d at 21, 364 N.E.2d at
989; Ecksel v. Orleans Constr. Co., 360 Pa. Super. 119, 127, 519 A.2d 1021,
1025 (1987).
106. See Ecksel, 360 Pa. Super. at 128, 519 A.2d at 1025.
107. See, e.g., Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 45, 740 P.2d 1022, 1030
(1987); Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 43, 389 N.E.2d 1154,
1159 (1979); Colsant, 97 111. App. 3d at 56, 421 N.E.2d at 1076; Ecksel, 360 Pa.
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Considering all the requirements which may apply to dis-
claimers in real property transactions, it is not surprising that
there frequently is at least one basis on which a court may find a
disclaimer ineffective. There are enough different requirements
(or at least requirements that look different) so that even if the
disclaimer passes one test, it can fail another. 0 8 In some cases,
the tests themselves seem to conflict. For example, the require-
ment that a disclaimer be clear and easily understood might well
conflict with the requirement that it also specifically and fully ex-
plain the consequences of the disclaimer.
The terms themselves also invite discretion: terms like "con-
spicuous," "clear," "unambiguous" and "specific" are descriptive
terms which do not tell a seller exactly what kind of clause will
pass a judicial test. These terms describe, rather than prescribe,
conclusions. Often these requirements function not so much as
tests for effectiveness of the disclaimer but as bases upon which
the court can state an opinion which is actually a reflection of the
policies underlying the creation of implied warranty protection.
In those cases where implied warranty protection is most appro-
priate-as where a first purchaser buys a new house from a
merchant-like builder-vendor-a contractual disclaimer is least
likely to be effective. A look at some of the cases involving dis-
claimers of the implied warranty in the sale of residential property
should illustrate this point.
C. Cases Where the Disclaimer Was Ineffective
As a general rule courts do not favor disclaimers of implied
warranties. As noted previously, disclaimers of the implied war-
ranty of habitability, especially in the sale of new residential prop-
erty, are construed strictly against the vendor. 10 9 In most cases,
Super. at 127, 519 A.2d at 1021; Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 28, 327
A.2d 831, 833 (1974).
108. For example, in Ecksel, the majority of the court found that the release
language was "broad and all-encompassing," and there was no evidence that the
release was negotiated by the parties. Ecksel, 360 Pa. Super. at 128, 519 A.2d at
1025. A concurring judge found that the language was not ambiguous, but
rather inconspicuous, stating "the fatal defect in the release is that it is buried in
the middle of a standard form contract in the same print size and type as the rest
of the contract." Id. at 135, 519 A.2d at 1029 (Rowley, J., concurring).
109. See, e.g., Colsant, 97 Il. App. 3d at 56, 421 N.E.2d at 1076 (holding
disclaimer does not negate implied warranty without buyer's knowledge and
consent); Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 IIl. App. 3d 310, 316, 415
N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (1980) (holding disclaimer invalid because obscure); Ecksel,
360 Pa. Super. 119, 519 A.2d 1021 (holding implied warranty of habitability
cannot be created by representation of builder).
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especially where the builder is a merchant-like vendor of new resi-
dential property, contractual disclaimers are ineffective to exclude
an implied warranty of habitability. These may be characterized
as (1) cases where a vendor contends that an express warranty
excludes the implied warranty; (2) cases where the contract con-
tains an "as is" or "in its present condition" clause; and (3) cases
where contract language expressly disclaims implied warranties.
1. Express Warranty Cases
The simplest disclaimer problem arises in those cases where
a seller argues that an express warranty supersedes or excludes
any implied warranty.' 10 As previously discussed, an express war-
ranty is generally ineffective to disclaim an implied warranty of
habitability absent any other specific disclaimer language in the
contract. I1 II
Even in a case where the express warranty specifically excludes
protection for a particular defect, the disclaimer may be ineffec-
tive if the defect in the structure is substantial. For example, in
Belt v. Spencer,' 12 the Belts purchased a new house from Spencer,
the builder. The Belts signed a contract which contained a provi-
sion stating that the seller agreed to provide "a Standard 1-year
Warranty except for cracking of concrete flatwork.' IS Soon after the
110. An express warranty of quality arises when the seller explicitly assures
the purchaser of a fact upon which he legally may rely. See, e.g., Dittman v.
Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 160, 168 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1969). In theory, the pur-
chaser and seller bargain for inclusion of all the terms and conditions in the
sales contract, and the purchaser can protect himself against defects in the prop-
erty or ensure a certain standard of quality by bargaining for express warranties
in the sales contract. In this case it was bargained that a well on the property
produce an adequate supply of water. Id. at 157, 168 N.W.2d at 192.
111. The notion that an express warranty does not preclude or is not incon-
sistent with an implied warranty of habitability is generally the rule in the sale of
real property as in the sale of goods. For a further discussion of this notion, see
supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
For example, in Bridges v. Ferrell, 685 P.2d 409 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984),
Ferrell built a single-family residence which he sold to another party who subse-
quently resold it to the Bridges. The original contract stated that the seller pro-
vided a one-year "builder's warranty," and the contract for resale of the house
provided that the warranty would be transferred to the Bridges. After the
Bridges took possession, they discovered structural problems in the house and
sued Ferrell for breach of implied warranty of habitability. Ferrell argued that
the express warranty should determine the extent and duration of his responsi-
bility. However, the court held that an express warranty, rather than supersed-
ing or excluding an implied warranty, was actually an added guarantee inserted
into the contract to extend, rather than limit, liability for faulty construction, and
it did not prescribe the owners' exclusive remedy. Id. at 411.
112. 41 Colo. App. 227, 585 P.2d 922 (1988).
113. Id. at 228, 585 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added).
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Belts took possession, Spencer responded to the Belts' com-
plaints and requested that a subcontractor regrade the backyard.
As a result of an expansive soil condition, cracks began to appear
in the basement floor after the regrading, and the floor slab
heaved and cracked. In addition, a foundation wall and walls in
the upper floors cracked, supported columns heaved, the upstairs
floors warped, a window broke, and the driveway slab heaved." 14
The Belts sued Spencer for breach of implied warranty and
Spencer in turn argued that the express warranty disclaimer re-
lieved him of liability for the defects under any implied warranty.
The appellate court affirmed judgment for the Belts, stating that
the language limiting an implied warranty must be clear and un-
ambiguous, and a disclaimer for "cracking" of concrete flatwork
did not disclaim liability for the "heaving" which occurred.' ' 5
Although "cracking" and "heaving" are not synonymous
terms, the concrete in the house purchased by the Belts clearly
cracked when it heaved. Despite the fact that liability for a partic-
ular defect was specifically disclaimed, the court affirmed judg-
ment for the purchaser because there was no express mention of
an implied warranty disclaimer in the contract. The court relied
on the fact that the term "heaving" implies a more violent defect
than cracking. The extent of the damage to the house as a result
of the defect and a desire to protect an innocent purchaser
against the builder-vendor were clearly critical factors in the
court's decision.' 16
Belt v. Spencer illustrates a court's general reluctance to permit
a contractual disclaimer of an implied warranty when a first pur-
chaser sues a builder-vendor for substantial latent defects that oc-
cur in a new home. The Belts were exactly the type of purchasers
that the implied warranty of habitability was designed to protect:
first purchasers of a new house built by a professional builder-
vendor. The defects in the house were unknown and not easily
discoverable by the purchaser. The contract executed by the par-
ties was a printed form contract.' 17 Because of all these circum-
114. Id. at 229, 585 P.2d at 924.
115. Id. at 231, 585 P.2d at 925.
116. The trial court had determined that the disclaimer referred to cos-
metic defects especially and did not exclude liability for substantial defects. Id.
at 230-31, 585 P.2d at 925. The appellate court did not necessarily disagree
with this interpretation, but concluded that "even if the disclaimer protected the
defendant from liability for all 'cracking', the defendant would still be liable for
the damage that did occur." Id. at 231, 585 P.2d at 925.
117. Id. at 228, 585 P.2d at 923.
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stances, the court was clearly inclined to afford implied warranty
protection to the purchasers, even though the contract language
in this case appeared to disclaim any warranty protection for the
type of defect which occurred. In Belt v. Spencer, the nature of the
transaction and the relationship of the parties, rather than the
precise language of the disclaimer in the contract, was the actual
basis for the court's decision. The court recognized this in its de-
cision when it stated that even if the disclaimer had protected the
builder from liability for all cracking, it would still hold the
builder liable for the kind of damage that occurred. 118
2. "As Is" and "In Its Present Condition" Disclaimers
Rather than expressly disclaiming warranty protection, a real
estate contract may contain a provision that the property is sold
"as is," or "in its present condition."''19 As in cases involving the
sale of goods, if there is no other express language of disclaimer
and the language is not conspicuous, these provisions are usually
ineffective to disclaim an implied warranty.' 20 The usual ration-
ale is that contractual terms such as "as is" or "in its present con-
dition" do not constitute a clear and unambiguous disclaimer of
the implied warranty of habitability because these terms standing
alone fail to notify the purchaser that he is giving up warranty
protection. This is especially true if there is no agreement by the
parties as to the meaning of the phrase' 2' or if there are other
reasonable interpretations of the meaning of the language.' 22
118. Id. at 231, 585 P.2d at 925.
119. For a discussion of "clear and unambiguous" disclaimers, see supra
notes 73-80 and accompanying text. Under U.C.C. § 2-316 "clear and unambig-
uous" disclaimer provisions may be effective to disclaim implied warranty pro-
tection in sale of goods cases. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1987).
120. In such cases, the rationale is similar to that stated in express warranty
cases-the average purchaser would not understand or interpret the provision
as an agreement to waive implied warranty protection and to accept the house
with an unknown latent structural defect. See Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479
S.W.2d 795, 800 (Mo. 1972).
121. See, e.g., Davis v. Bradley, 676 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)
(although plaintiffs were aware of presence of "as is" clause in contract, there
was no agreement as to its meaning). The trial court found that the clause did
not limit the implied warranties of workmanlike construction and habitability in
any respect since the plaintiffs intended only that the Bradleys would be relieved
of any obligation to perform further work on the house, not that they would be
relieved of their obligation to have performed already completed work in con-
formance with the building code. Id.
122. See, e.g., Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 Ill. App. 3d 800, 443 N.E.2d 36
(1982) (court held parties intended phrase "as is" to refer to state of completion
of house rather than disclaimer of warranties). The Schoeneweis court also noted
that both parties were laymen, and that warranties were not expressly discussed.
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As in Belt v. Spencer, the question of whether the circum-
stances are such that warranty protection should exist is a signifi-
cant factor distinguishing those cases where an "as is" disclaimer
is effective from those where it is ineffective. In those cases where
a new house is sold "as is" to a consumer-purchaser by a profes-
sional builder, where there are no objective reasons for the pur-
chaser to suspect any latent defects in the structure, the
disclaimer is most likely to be found ineffective because it is un-
clear or unspecific. 12
3
For example, in Casavant v. Campopiano,' 24 the Casavants
purchased a one-year-old house from the Campopiano and Re-
camp Enterprises, Inc. Six months later the Casavants discovered
that the roof of the house was sagging, and they sued the
Campopianos for breach of an implied warranty of habitability for
the defective roof. Remo Campopiano had been engaged in the
business of building houses for twenty years, while Mr. Casavant,
on the other hand, had a ninth-grade education and had
purchased a house on only one previous occasion. The contract
contained a clause which provided that the premises would be de-
livered "in the same condition in which they now are," excluding
Id. at 804, 443 N.E.2d at 40. For a recent discussion of this case and other Illi-
nois cases, see Anderson, supra note 9.
123. Even in a sale of a used residence, where the builder-vendor cannot
show that the original purchaser knowingly waived the warranty, an "as is"
clause may not prevent recovery by subsequent purchasers. In Swaw v. Ortell,
137 Ill. App. 3d 60, 484 N.E.2d 780 (1984), for example, the Swaws sued several
defendants seeking to recover on various theories for structural defects in their
home. Among other things, the Swaws alleged that the builder Presley-Chicago,
Inc. (Presley), successor to Allied Homes, Inc., was liable for breach of implied
warranty. The house had a prior history of structural and foundation problems,
and in 1973, Allied repurchased the house from Rakers, its second purchaser,
because of the continuing serious structural problems. Id. at 65, 484 N.E.2d at
784. After an intervening tenancy, in 1975 Presley sold the house to the Ortells
"as is" for $36,500. In 1978 the Swaws purchased the house from the Ortells
for $64,900. Id. at 66, 484 N.E.2d at 784. Presley argued that the Swaws had no
cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability because the Swaws
had purchased the house from the Ortells who purchased it from the builder "as
is." The court said it did not need to resolve the issue whether or not a waiver
by a prior purchaser waived that cause of action as to all subsequent purchasers
because Presley failed to show that the Ortells knowingly waived the implied
warranty of habitability. According to the court, Presley failed to show a con-
spicuous provision which fully disclosed the consequences of its inclusion and
that such was in fact the agreement reached. Id. at 71, 484 N.E.2d at 788.
124. 114 R.I. 24, 327 A.2d 831 (1974). The facts indicated that upon com-
pletion of the basic structure of the house, the Campopianos rented it to a mar-
ried couple who intended to purchase the house as soon as they were able to
secure the necessary financing. Sometime within a year after taking possession,
the tenants vacated the premises, and shortly thereafter the house was sold to
the Casavants. Id. at 25, 327 A.2d at 832.
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reasonable use and wear and unavoidable casualty damage. 125
The court considered this provision to be one of doubtful
meaning which should be construed strictly against the Campopi-
anos. It also noted that in sale of goods cases, courts are reluc-
tant to construe "acceptance in present condition" clauses as
sufficient grounds for exclusion of implied warranties unless the
language is used with specific reference to its effect. The ration-
ale for holding that the disclaimer was ineffective was that the lan-
guage did not meet the requirement of specificity.' 26 However,
the court acknowledged its desire to effectuate the policies under-
lying the implied warranties of habitability and reasonable work-
manship by construing the provision strictly against the builder-
vendor. 127
3. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranty Protection
In some cases a contract contains a "boilerplate" merger
clause which contains language to the effect that the written
agreement is the entire agreement between the parties and no
other warranties have been made or shall be binding on the par-
ties.' 28 Even in this situation, if the language of the agreement
specifically fails to exclude the implied warranties, the disclaimer
125. The clause in the contract provided: "Full possession of the said
premises, free of all tenants is to be delivered to the party of the second part at
the time of the delivery of the deed, the said premises to be then in the same
condition in which they now are, reasonable use and wear of the buildings
thereon, and damage by fire or other unavoidable casualty excepted." Id. at 27-
28, 327 A.2d at 833 (emphasis added by court).
126. Id. at 28, 327 A.2d at 834.
127. Id. at 28, 327 A.2d at 833.
128. A "merger" clause is a clause in the contract which merges prior nego-
tiations into the writing as, for example, "[t]his writing contains the entire agree-
ment of the parties and there are no promises, understandings, or agreements of
any kind pertaining to this contract other than stated herein." See A. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 11, § 7.3, at 458. Under the parol evidence rule, a merger
clause may prohibit the introduction of evidence of an express warranty not con-
tained in the writing, regardless of whether the clause is effective to disclaim any
implied warranties. If a court determines that the written contract for sale was
"fully integrated," then even consistent additional terms to that agreement are
inadmissible. Id. at 451-52. For example, in Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho
37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987), the purchaser of duplexes sued the builder and sellers
because of structural defects. Among other things, the purchasers alleged that
the sellers breached an express warranty that the duplexes were well-con-
structed. Id. at 43, 740 P.2d at 1028. Both the earnest money agreement and
the real estate contract contained "merger" clauses, which was one fact indicat-
ing to the court that the parties intended the contract to be a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Id. at 44, 740 P.2d at 1029.
As a result, the court found that the evidence of the warranty was properly ex-
cluded, and the action for breach of express warranty was properly dismissed.
Id. at 45, 740 P.2d at 1030. However, the same contract language was insuffi-
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may be ineffective because it lacks specificity.' 29
If the clause specifically refers to implied warranties, as in
"no warranties, whether oral, implied or otherwise have been
made," the disclaimer may still be ineffective because it is incon-
spicuous or fails to mention "habitability."'' 30 Thus, an express
disclaimer which is located on the back of a standard form con-
tract, which does not mention "habitability" or explain the conse-
quences of the disclaimer, may be ineffective to exclude implied
warranty protection. '31
Even if a conspicuous, specific, express disclaimer of the im-
plied warranty of habitability is effective against a first purchaser,
the disclaimer and express warranty provision in the original sales
contract may not preclude an implied warranty action by the sec-
ond purchaser. In Nastri v. Wood Brothers Homes,' 32 the Nastris
were second purchasers of a house constructed by Wood Broth-
ers Homes. The house was sold in February 1978 to a couple
cient to effectively disclaim an implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 46, 740
P.2d at 1031.
129. For example, in Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 202,
225 S.E.2d 557, 567 (1976), the contract, on a standard printed form used by
the seller, contained the following provision: "Buyer hereby acknowledges that
he has inspected the above described property, that no representations or in-
ducements have been made other than those expressed herein, and that this
contract contains the entire agreement between all parties hereto." The seller
argued this language was effective to exclude an implied warranty of habitability.
The court disagreed, stating that the language purported to exclude only "rep-
resentations or inducements." Since the implied warranty of workmanlike qual-
ity does not exist by reason of representation or inducement, there is no waiver.
Id. at 202, 225 S.E.2d at 568.
In Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977), the Cony-
ers purchased a house from Molloy, the builder. The Conyers alleged that there
was lack of ventilation in the attic which caused water damage in the house. The
contract contained the following provision: "There are no warranties on either
house except those manufacturers' warranties that are in effect." Id. at 18, 364
N.E.2d at 987. The Conyers argued that this language did not waive the implied
warranty of habitability, but, even if it did, the waiver was void as against public
policy. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Conyers' complaint by
finding that the contract disclaimer was insufficient to adequately disclaim the
implied warranty. The court did so by finding that the provision was overbroad,
too general and too unspecific. While it agreed that all of the arguments in favor
of the implied warranty would support the proposition that it should not be so
easy to avoid, the court refused to go so far as to hold that disclaimers of war-
ranty are void as against public policy, even though "freedom of contract is not
so broad as it might once have been." Id. at 22, 364 N.E.2d at 990.
130. For a further discussion of the conspicuous and specificity require-
ments, see supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Il1. App. 3d 310, 316-17,
415 N.E.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1980); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d
581, 589, 410 N.E.2d 902, 909 (1980).
132. 142 Ariz. 439, 690 P.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1984).
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who in turn sold it to the Nastris in March 1980.1 33 The contract
between the first purchasers and Wood Brothers Homes con-
tained a lengthy provision that included an express limited war-
ranty for one year and specifically excluded any other warranties,
express or implied, including the warranty of fitness for habita-
tion.134 When cracks in the foundation occurred as a result of
settlement because the residence was built on "collapsible" soil,
the Nastris sued the builder for breach of implied warranty of
construction in a workman-like manner and habitability.1 3 5 The
builder contended that the disclaimer in the contract with the first
purchasers negated the implied warranty.1 36
The appellate court did not agree. Noting that the instru-
ment was a contract of adhesion and might be unenforceable on
that basis,' 37 and that an express warranty for a limited time can-
not displace the implied warranty of habitability, 3 8 the court di-
rectly addressed the question as one of public policy. Finding
that the purpose of the implied warranty of habitability is to pro-
tect innocent purchasers and hold builders accountable for their
work, the court held that any attempted disclaimer of the implied
warranty of habitability is void as against public policy as to an
innocent subsequent purchaser.' 3 9
The Nastri court squarely placed the responsibility for sub-
stantial defects in a newly constructed home where it belongs-on
the builder-vendor. By framing the question in terms of public
policy, the court put builder-vendors on notice that they may be
potentially liable to subsequent purchasers for substantial latent
defects in the home, regardless of contractual disclaimers in the
original sales contract. 40
If the policies underlying implied warranty protection for
purchasers of new homes are to be effectuated, the Nastri decision
133. Id. at 440, 690 P.2d at 159.
134. Id.
135. The Nastris also alleged that the builder was liable under the theory of
strict liability and negligence. Id.
136. Id. at 441, 690 P.2d at 160.
137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 442, 690 P.2d at 161.
139. Id. at 443, 690 P.2d at 162.
140. Many courts have extended warranty protection to subsequent pur-
chasers who purchase a house that is only about four years old. See, e.g., Barnes
v. MacBrown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976). The Nastri decision
mandates that even if the builder-vendor effectively disclaims the implied war-
ranty as to the first purchaser, he may still be liable to a subsequent purchaser.
Nastri, 142 Ariz. at 443, 690 P.2d at 162.
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is clearly justified. There is no other way to ensure that warranty
protection is not waived by a first purchaser as to an innocent
subsequent purchaser. As to first purchasers, so long as courts
are unwilling to find disclaimers of the implied warranty of habita-
bility void as against public policy, there will be cases where the
disclaimer meets all legal criteria and thus is effective to exclude
implied warranty protection.141
D. Cases Where the Disclaimer Was Effective
Although less frequent, there are cases where contractual dis-
claimers have been found effective to exclude an implied warranty
of habitability in the sale of real property. 42 In most of these
cases, the parties were more equal partners in the bargaining pro-
cess or the property was commercial investment property. In one
case, the contract language met all the requirements established
by the court for effective disclaimer and thus the disclaimer was
enforced. 43 In another case, a court found the disclaimer effec-
tive by relying on what it regarded as fundamental policies of
freedom of contract in sale of goods cases. 144
1. Cases Where Policies Underlying the Implied Warranty
Were Not Served
In cases where the property is commercial, rather than resi-
dential, and the sellers and purchasers are commercial parties
with equal bargaining power, there are fewer reasons to extend
warranty protection to a purchaser and more reasons to permit
contractual disclaimers of warranty protection.
An example of such a case is Frickel v. Sunnyside Enterprises,
Inc. '145 in which the Frickels purchased an apartment complex for
investment purposes. Sunnyside Enterprises had not built the
property for resale but for its own ownership and management.
The contract was not a form contract but one expressly tailored
to the transaction, and it contained a disclaimer clause.146 When
141. See, e.g., Country Squire Homeowners Ass'n v. Crest Hill Dev. Corp.,
150 Ill. App. 3d 30, 501 N.E.2d 794 (1986).
142. See, e.g, id.; Tibbits v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967);
Frickel v. Sunnyside Enter. Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986);
Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983).
143. Country Squire Homeowners Ass n, 150 Ill. App. 3d 30, 501 N.E.2d 794.
144. G-W-L Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393-94 (Tex. 1982) (quot-
ing Pyle v. Eastern Seed Co., 198 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Tex. 1946)), overruled by
Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
145. 106 Wash. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986).
146. The clause stated:
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the Frickels learned that the building's foundations were inade-
quate and improperly designed, they brought suit for breach of
implied warranty of habitability.
The court first determined that there was no implied war-
ranty under these circumstances because the rationales support-
ing the implied warranty doctrine were not met. 147 It also found
the contractual disclaimer effective to exclude any implied war-
ranty protection because the language of the disclaimer was clear
and unambiguous. 48 It noted that the buyers had sought out the
property, had had ample opportunity to inspect the property, and
had their own attorney. In the typical transaction between the
average home-buyer and the vendor-builder of new houses, the
parties are in an inherently unequal bargaining position. Where
the purchasers are experienced and in a position to seek expert
help, as in this instance, the court said there are no policy reasons
to impose upon the sellers a guaranty that the parties neither ne-
gotiated nor expected.149
An "as is" disclaimer also can be an effective waiver of the
implied warranty of habitability when the seller is not a builder-
vendor but rather an amateur builder who builds a house for his
own occupancy. 15 0 A purchaser of residential property for invest-
The purchaser agrees that full inspection of said real estate has
been made and that neither the seller nor his assigns shall be held to
any covenant respecting the condition of any improvements thereon
nor shall the purchaser or seller or the assigns of either be held to any
covenant or agreement for alterations, improvements or repairs unless
the covenant or agreement relied on is contained herein or is in writing
and attached and made a part of the contract.
Id. at 716, 725 P.2d at 423.
147. Id. at 718-19, 725 P.2d at 424-25.
148. Id. at 721, 725 P.2d at 426.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983). In this case, a
house was placed on the market, listed, advertised and sold by the Howes on an
"as is" basis, and the asking price for the partially completed residence declined
over the time between listing and sale. When numerous problems arose, the
Schepps brought an action for fraud and breach of implied warranty, and the
trial court entered summary judgment for the Howes because the purchasers
could not have relied on any false representation by the sellers. The trial court
further held that no warranty of habitability attached to the sale of a home by an
amateur builder not intending to engage in a commercial venture. Id.
The Wyoming Supreme Court was unwilling to find that as a matter of law
an implied warranty would not apply under these circumstances. Rather, it held
that the proper ground for affirming the trial court on the implied warranty
claim was on the basis of waiver. The court relied on U.C.C. § 2-316(c) as indic-
ative of the state's policy. Id. at 509. It was undisputed that the disclaimer was
brought to the attention of the Schepps and agreed to by them. There is almost
no other discussion of the rationales on which the effectiveness of the warranty
disclaimer was based. Id.
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ment purposes also may have greater difficulty maintaining an ac-
tion for breach of implied warranty where the contract contains
an "in its present condition" disclaimer. 151 These cases demon-
strate that courts are generally more likely to recognize the effec-
tiveness of a disclaimer of warranty in circumstances where
rationales supporting implied warranty protection are not pres-
ent, as in cases where the parties' bargaining power is equal. In
these cases, courts are more likely to support the policy favoring
freedom of contract and are less likely to intervene in contracts
allocating risks by the parties.
2. Cases Relying on Freedom of Contract
At least one court has held an implied warranty disclaimer
valid on the basis of the parties' freedom of contract and the pur-
chaser's duty to read what he signs, citing a sale of goods case for
the proposition that the parties have a right to make a one-sided
contract if they choose. In G-W-L Inc., v. Robichaux,' 52 the
Robichaux brought suit under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act for defects in a new house purchased from builder-ven-
dor G-W-L, Inc. ("Goldstar"). The jury found that Goldstar had
failed to construct the roof in a workmanlike manner and that the
house was not merchantable at the time of completion, and the
court of appeals affirmed that decision.' 53
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judg-
ments, finding that a provision in the promissory note signed by
the Robichaux which stated there were no warranties, express or
implied, was effective to disclaim any implied warranty of habita-
bility. 154 The court stated that the language in the promissory
note waiving the implied warranty was clear and free from doubt
151. See Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967). The
court held that a contract clause stating that the buyer accepts the property "in
its present condition" was sufficient to disclaim the implied warranty. In Tibbilts
the properties included two subdivision lots with houses and an adjacent vacant
parcel. The evidence also showed that the Openshaws, the purchasers, had
waited for nearly three years before registering their complaint. The trial court
had dismissed the Openshaw's counterclaim on that basis, and the supreme
court affirmed its decision both for the purchaser's lack of timeliness and on the
basis of the disclaimer.
152. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982), overruled by Melody Home Mfg. Co. v.
Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
153. Id. at 392.
154. Id. at 393. The entire provision stated:
This note, the aforesaid Mechanic's and Materialmen's Lien Contract
and the plans and specification signed for identification by the parties
hereto constitute the entire agreement between the parties hereto with
reference to the erection of said improvements, there being no oral
1989] 1153
31
Powell: Disclaimers of Implied Warranty in the Sale of New Homes
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
and that the parties to a contract had an obligation to protect
themselves by reading what they had signed. 155
The majority in Robichaux based its decision on a policy favor-
ing freedom of contract and ignored the policy considerations un-
derlying creation of the implied warranty of habitability or good
workmanship in the sale of new homes. The implied warranty of
habitability was created to protect purchasers like the Robichaux,
who reasonably expected their house to be built in a good and
workmanlike manner and that the builder will be held accounta-
ble if it is not. By allowing Goldstar to escape liability through
the use of a disclaimer clause in a promissory note, the majority
effectively eliminated implied warranty protection for many pur-
chasers who, like the Robichaux, may sign form contracts without
understanding the implications of such waiver language. The re-
sult is that sophisticated builders can escape accountability
through the use of such waiver language and thus the responsibil-
ity imposed by the warranty is too easily avoided.
Three judges dissented in this case, arguing that because of
the important policy considerations underlying creation of the
warranty, a court should not consider the warranty waived except
by very express and specific language which reflects that the
buyer knew the implied warranty did not attach to the sale of the
home. 156 The minority position recognized that it is awkward to
reason that a buyer has rights under the implied warranity, and
then declare that these rights can be taken away without his
knowledge. 157
The logic of the minority position in Robichaux subsequently
prevailed in 1987 in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes,158
where the purchasers of a modular pre-fabricated home sued the
manufacturer. In Melody, the purchasers, the Barneses, filed an
action against the manufacturer, Melody Homes, for breach of
implied warranty under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
alleging that the manufacturer had failed to construct the home in
a good and workmanlike manner and had failed to repair contin-
agreements, representations, conditions, warranties, express or im-
plied, in addition to said written instruments.
Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 395 (Spears, J., dissenting).
157. See Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability-Con-
tract Language Stating No Warranties, Express or Implied, is Effective Disclaimer of Implied
Warranty of Fitness and Habitability in Sale of New House by Builder-Vendor, 15 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 673, 686 (1984); see also Anderson, supra note 9, at 540.
158. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
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ual leaks in the home. 159 In affirming the judgment for the
Barneses, the Texas Supreme Court held that an implied war-
ranty that repair or modification services of goods or property
will be performed in a good or workmanlike manner may not be
disclaimed. 60 In overruling Robichaux to the extent it conflicted
with this opinion, the Texas Supreme Court supported the public
policy arguments raised by the dissent in Robichaux and stated that
there are important policies underlying the implied warranty
which should not be easily avoided. 16 1 The court noted that a
consumer continues to expect that the services he receives will be
performed in a good and workmanlike manner regardless of the
small print in the contract, and a disclaimer allows the service
provider to circumvent this expectation and encourages shoddy
workmanship. 162
So long as disclaimers are not uniformly void as against pub-
lic policy, a contract disclaimer which meets all the tests set out by
the courts may be enforced even though enforcement will not
serve the policies underlying creation of the warranty. 63 How-
ever, the protections provided by the implied warranty of habita-
bility and the rationales underlying its development are too
important to permit exclusion of warranty protection through
contract disclaimer. A builder-vendor should not be permitted to
exclude that warranty protection in sales of new residential prop-
erty, however clear and conspicuous the disclaimer. For the rea-
sons next discussed, disclaimers in the sale of new residential
property by a builder-vendor should be declared void as against
public policy.
159. Id. at 351.
160. Id. at 355.
161. Id. The court stated that an actionable implied warranty will further
the policy of giving consumers an efficient and economical means of securing
protection from poor quality services. Id. at 355 n.9.
162. Id. at 355.
163. See Country Squire Homeowners Ass'n v. Crest Hill Dev. Corp., 150
Ill. App. 3d 30, 501 N.E.2d 794 (1986). In this case, a townhouse homeowners
organization sued the Crest Hill Development Corporation, a builder-developer,
for damages resulting from breach of implied warranty. The disclaimer was con-
spicuously located in the three-page contract, printed in large-size print, and
used plain non-technical language. The disclaimer also used the terminology
suggested by the state's supreme court-"the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness." The court felt it had little choice but to find that
the disclaimer was, as a matter of law, part of the agreement between the parties.
Id. at 33, 501 N.E.2d at 797.
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IV. ARGUMENT: DISCLAIMERS IN THE SALE OF NEW RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY BY BUILDER-VENDORS SHOULD BE DECLARED
VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
There are several reasons why a general disclaimer of the im-
plied warranty of habitability in the sale of new residential prop-
erty by a builder-vendor should be void as against public policy.
One reason for the courts' reluctance to declare these disclaimers
unenforceable is the fact that disclaimers of implied warranties
are specifically permitted in sale of goods cases under the
UCC. 164 There are, however, good reasons to distinguish the sale
of new residential property from the sale of goods. The fact that
disclaimers of implied warranty protection are permitted under
the UCC does not necessarily justify their enforcement in the sale
of new residential property.
A. Rationales Distinguishing Sale of Goods Cases
In his insightful article examining unconscionability and the
UCC,165 Professor Leffnotes that subject matter has effect on the
form it takes and the legal rules which are developed to define
that form: "[W]idgets and Blackacre are not the same, are not
dealt with by parties in the same way and (at least arguably) ought
not to be treated identically in the law."' 66
Land and chattels are different, and different rules should
and do apply to their sale.167 The law recognizes that real prop-
erty has great and lasting value, and that transactions in land are
almost always of significance.' 68 Land is unique, and the supply
of land is limited. Even though a house may resemble a manufac-
tured good, the land upon which it sits does not. For example, if
a toaster is defective, it can be replaced with another toaster, but a
house cannot be replaced with another house somewhere else be-
cause its location and the land on which it sits are fundamental to
its value.
Unlike most manufactured goods, a house and land can be
164. For a discussion of disclaimers in "sale of goods" cases, see supra
notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
165. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 485 (1967).
166. Id. at 535 (footnote omitted).
167. For example, contracts involving the sale of land are required to be in
writing under the Statute of Frauds, while, on the other hand, contracts for the
sale of goods (at least relatively inexpensive goods) are not. See A. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, § 6.5, at 397.
168. Id.
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expected to increase in value over time. Frequently a used or
"pre-owned" house will cost more than when it was built. Unlike
the purchase of most manufactured goods, the purchase of a
house is a major investment, and substantial latent defects in the
house diminish not only the purchaser's expectations of use and
enjoyment of the home, but also his expectation of its long-term
investment value.
It may make sense to allow a manufacturer to disclaim war-
ranty protection on a toaster or a fountain pen, since a consumer
can always shop around for another one, but the same is not true
in the purchase of a house. The market may be limited, especially
if the purchaser desires a particular type of house in a particular
location. Each house is unique, and a purchaser often will not
have a choice between identical or even substantially similar
products because he desires a particular type of house in a partic-
ular neighborhood or school district.
The purchase of a house is much more likely to be a once-in-
a-lifetime transaction, and the relationship between the seller and
buyer is different as a result. A purchaser may buy countless
groods, often from the same merchant-seller, but he is much less
likely to purchase another house from the same builder-vendor.
When that builder-vendor is "merchant-like" because he is in the
business of selling houses, his reputation is of course very impor-
tant. But the builder-vendor is less likely than the merchant to
expect the same purchaser to return for another transaction in
the future, and thus the builder may be less motivated to satisfy
that particular purchaser. A manufacturer-seller of goods may
provide express warranties and choose not to disclaim implied
warranties in order to be competitive with other manufacturer-
sellers in the market, but the same concern may not be present
for the builder-vendor.
In imposing implied warranty protection in the sale of new
homes, courts recognize that an unsophisticated purchaser may
not understand the need to protect himself through specific con-
tractual language. Presumably that same unsophisticated pur-
chaser may not understand the effect of a disclaimer clause in the
sales contract. For this reason, to allow a builder-vendor to es-
cape liability for selling a new house that fails to meet a reason-
able test of habitability and good workmanship through
disclaimer language in the contract, however conspicuous or
clear, should not be permitted. The value, uniqueness, and en-
durance of the property, its significance to the purchaser, and the
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nature of the relationship between the parties is different in sales
of real property, and strict analogy to sale of goods cases is inap-
propriate. While disclaimers may be a legitimate device for allo-
cating risks in the sale of goods, they are inappropriate in sales of
new houses by a builder-vendor. The parties should, of course,
be permitted to negotiate waiver or disclaimer of specific defects
known to the purchaser because the implied warranty only pro-
tects against unknown latent defects in the property. But general
contractual disclaimers of implied warranty protection should not
be permitted, however conspicuous or clear they may be. 169
Most real estate contracts today are standardized contract
forms.' 70 In the usual case, a consumer never even reads the
form, or reads it only after he has signed it. 17 1 In addition, it may
never occur to the purchaser that a disclaimer clause in the con-
tract may allow the builder to escape liability for faulty workman-
ship. The purchaser who signs such a contract may not know
about, let alone understand, the meaning of a particular clause.
This problem is usually addressed through the requirements of
conspicuousness and knowledge, and disclaimer clauses which
are buried in mounds of standardized contract language will fail
because they cannot meet these requirements.
But the tests of conspicuousness are often unclear and ill-
defined: the rules are developed in a case-by-case basis and de-
pend on such factors as length of the document, position of the
clause, language and even bargaining power of the parties. Using
a test of conspicuousness, specificity and knowledge leads to un-
certainty by the seller and increased litigation by aggrieved pur-
chasers who must prove the requirements were not met in their
given case.
169. This argument is not new. In 1965 one author wrote: "A forceful
argument can also be made for the proposition that any disclaimer of fitness for
habitation in the sale of new construction is unconscionable and against public
policy." Haskell, supra note 1, at 654 (emphasis added).
170. A. FARswoRTH, supra note 11, § 4.26, at 293. Most, but not all, real
estate contracts are standardized contract forms. The use of standardized con-
tract forms has increased so much that today the typical agreement is made on a
standard pre-printed form. While there are economic arguments that favor the
use of such forms, there is also the concern that "formishness" can be a vice
when one party has monopolistic powers, as in some merchant-consumer rela-
tionships. Id. at 293-302.
171. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971).
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B. Policy Against Subterfuge
The question of whether warranty disclaimers in the sale of
real property should be permitted is a question of social policy
and should be addressed as such. Policing these contract dis-
claimer clauses on a case-by-case basis using criteria such as "con-
spicuousness," and "specificity" enables courts to avoid.
addressing the social policy questions involved.' 72 If a fair price
demands a sound product, then a rule disallowing disclaimers in
cases of sale of new residential property is justified and should be
imposed.
Holding disclaimers unenforceable in contracts for the sale
of new homes would eliminate the uncertainty that now arises
when a contract for the sale of a new home contains a disclaimer
clause. This uncertainty leads to more litigation and increased
costs for both parties. As things now stand, the builder-vendor
cannot know whether he will be responsible for latent defects in
the house until litigation resolves the question. Moreover, even if
the disclaimer is effective as to the first purchaser, he still may be
liable to a subsequent purchaser for latent defects in the
property. ' 73
Unconscionable disclaimer clauses are unenforceable in sale
of goods cases, 174 and by analogy the same theory could be used
to invalidate disclaimers in sales of real property.175 However, it
is very difficult to define what level of bargaining misbehavior
must be reached to warrant judicial invalidation under this the-
ory, and the theory raises the same problems inherent in a case-
by-case approach. More importantly, it is the level of responsibil-
ity of the builder-vendor, and not the dynamics of the bargaining
process, which courts should address. Disclaimers in sales of new
residential property by a merchant-like builder-vendor should be
invalid because of the importance of the policies favoring recog-
nition of the implied warranty. Concerns for freedom of contract
can be met by permitting disclaimer of known specific defects in
172. See Leff, supra note 165, at 515. Leff writes: "On the other hand, if
one decides to police contracts on a clause-by-clause basis, he finds that he has
merely substituted the highly abstract, 'unconscionable' for the possibility of
more concrete and particularized thinking about particular problems of social
policy." Id. f
173. See, e.g., Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, 142 Ariz. 439, 690 P.2d 158 (Ct.
App. 1984) (holding builder-vendor liable to subsequent purchaser).
174. Some find it "frankly incredible" that U.C.C. § 2-302 is applicable to
warranty disclaimers, but such is the case. Leff, supra note 165, at 523.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
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the property, but general disclaimers of implied warranty protec-
tion should not be permitted. If the builder-vendor does not re-
main liable for substantial latent defects in new residential
property, the important policies underlying creation of the war-
ranty are too easily defeated. The courts' attempts to deal with
the problem by invalidating disclaimers through application of re-
quirements or tests avoid addressing the real question-whether,
as a matter of policy, the builder-vendor should ultimately bear
responsibility for latent defects in the structure.
By holding disclaimer clauses in contracts for sale of new res-
idential property unenforceable, the responsibility for latent de-
fects will be placed properly on the builder-vendor, who is in the
best position to know about, repair and bear the financial risk for
such defects. The purchaser then will be assured of receiving
what he is entitled to expect-a new house free of substantial la-
tent defects. After all, it was for these reasons that the warranty
was first recognized.
V. CONCLUSION
Today a majority of states recognize an implied warranty of
quality in the sale of new homes. This implied warranty of habita-
bility or good workmanship is designed to protect the average
purchaser who lacks the ability and expertise to inspect for and
discover defects in a new house. Like the implied warranty of
merchantability in the sale of goods, the implied warranty of hab-
itability protects the reasonable expectations of the parties. The
purchaser expects and should be entitled to receive a house that
is structurally sound, habitable and free from hidden defects.
The important policy considerations underlying the recogni-
tion and expansion of an implied warranty of habitability in the
sale of new homes must co-exist with long-standing American no-
tions of freedom of contract and the ability of parties to freely
negotiate the terms of their agreement.' 76 Contractual disclaim-
ers of the implied warranty of habitability create problems for the
courts because the policies underlying imposition of the warranty
often conflict with policies favoring freedom of contract. No
doubt the trend favoring freedom of contract has declined in this
century as the free enterprise system has declined and state regu-
176. Contract law as it developed in the 19th century was dominated by the
notion of freedom of contract, because freedom to make enforceable bargains
was thought to maximize the good to society as a whole as well as an individual's
freedom. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 1.7, at 21.
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lation of contracts has increased, 177 but the presumption remains
that parties should be able to agree to allocate risks by contract
and to exclude implied warranty protection. To determine the
effectiveness of a disclaimer, therefore, courts still look to the par-
ticular circumstances of a case to see whether the clause was
freely negotiated.
Factors like conspicuousness, specificity and clarity are fre-
quently given as the bases for a court's decision as to whether a
disclaimer of implied warranty protection is effective. But in most
cases the effectiveness of the disclaimer depends not only on the
actual contract language, but on factors such as the kind of prop-
erty sold, the relationship and relative bargaining power of the
parties and the sophistication of the purchaser. The more com-
pelling the reasons for imposing implied warranty protection, as
where the purchaser is unsophisticated and inexperienced and
the seller is a merchant-like builder, the less likely it is that a court
will enforce the disclaimer.
The use of criteria such as "conspicuousness" and "specific-
ity" to determine the effectiveness of disclaimers in these cases
allows courts to avoid confronting the issue in terms of the real
policy issues presented-whether the builder-vendor should be li-
able for latent defects in the structure as against an innocent pur-
chaser. Where the builder-vendor is in a position of superior
expertise and bargaining power, and the property is new residen-
tial property, the disclaimer is almost always held invalid on the
basis of one or more criteria established by the court. A better
approach in these cases would be for courts to address the issue
directly as one of public policy and hold that disclaimers in con-
tracts for sale of a new residence by a builder-vendor to a first
purchaser are void.
By holding disclaimers void as against public policy, the
builder-vendor would know that he is responsible for any sub-
stantial latent defects in the property, regardless of contract lan-
guage. The price of the house would presumably reflect this fact.
It would resolve the question of whether a subsequent purchaser
is bound by disclaimer in the original contract. Most importantly,
the policies underlying the warranty would be served and the in-
nocent and unsophisticated purchaser protected.
No court has yet gone so far. In most real property dis-
claimer cases, courts look for guidance to sale of goods cases
177. Id. at 22.
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which are governed by provisions of the UCC. UCC section 2-
316 specifically permits disclaimers of implied warranty protec-
tion in the sale of goods if certain requirements are met, and
many courts find the UCC provisions indicative of a state's policy
on disclaimers in general. 78 Requirements such as conspicuous-
ness clearly reflect UCC criteria. There are, however, important
distinctions between sales of new residential property and sales of
goods. Real property has lasting value and it is unique. Its sup-
ply is limited. If the structure is defective, it cannot be replaced
easily by another structure somewhere else because its value and
usefulness depends on its special location. Furthermore, the
purchase of a new house is likely to be a once-in-a-lifetime
purchase. As a result, there are fewer reasons for a builder-ven-
dor to warrant the quality of the product than in goods cases
where the seller hopes to attract the purchaser back for subse-
quent purchases.
The important policies underlying warranty protection for
the purchaser of a new house from a builder-vendor simply out-
weigh the policies favoring freedom of contract in these cases. A
seller and purchaser should be permitted to allocate risks for spe-
cific known defects in the structure, but general disclaimers of im-
plied warranty protection should not be permitted. By
addressing the question as one of public policy, rather than by
applying discretion-inviting criteria, the courts would squarely
place the responsibility for latent defects in new housing where it
belongs-on the builder-vendor, who is in the best position to
discover the defect, repair it and bear the cost of that repair. In
this way, the important purposes of the implied warranty of habit-
ability in the sale of new homes will be served.
178. See, e.g., Petersen v. Hubschman Const. Co., 76 Il. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d
1154 (1979). The majority writes, "It would more accurately convey the mean-
ing of the warranty as used in this context if it were to be phrased in language
similar to that used in the Uniform Commercial Code, warranty of
merchantability, or warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." Id. at 41-42,
389 N.E.2d at 1158.
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